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I. INTRODUCTION 
Who should be liable for motor vehicle accident injuries when the 
driver is not the vehicle owner?  According to Christensen v. Milbank 
Insurance Co., the owner is liable in virtually every circumstance upon 
 
      †     J.D. candidate 2005, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Japanese Language, 
University of Minnesota, 1997.  Special appreciation to Sylvia Iijima, Wesley Iijima, and 
Ann Iijima for their encouragement and support.  
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granting permission.1  Minnesota policy attempts to guarantee recovery 
for automobile accident victims, and is the overriding factor in deciding 
the outcome of motor vehicle injury cases.2 
This note explores the Christensen decision and its effect on motor 
vehicle owner liability in Minnesota.3  First, the note presents a historical 
perspective from which to view the Christensen decision and 
Minnesota’s motor vehicle liability and conversion laws.4  Next, the note 
summarizes the factual and procedural history of the Christensen case.5  
Then the note discusses the Minnesota Supreme Court holding in 
Christensen.6  The note goes further to present a policy and legal analysis 
of the Christensen decision.7  Further, the note suggests an amendment to 
allow evenhanded treatment of vehicle owners, while satisfying state 
policy.8  The note concludes that the Christensen decision is a necessary 
extension of existing legal interpretation because it supports Minnesota 
and tort law goals by ensuring compensation to injured accident victims.9 
II. A NATIONAL HISTORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The automobile “threw America’s industrial revolution into 
overdrive,” created the middle class, and has become a symbol of 
American life.10  Automobiles also injure and kill millions of people 
 
 1. 658 N.W.2d 580, 588 (Minn. 2003) (Blatz, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating vehicle owners will be liable in every circumstance except 
theft). 
 2. See id. at 587 (stating negligence will not be found where it contravenes public 
policy); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 165-
66 (Minn. 1983) (stating the legislature and supreme court adopt and interpret acts to 
favor public policy and that public policy is to give injured persons an “approximate 
certainty” of relief) (quoting Hutchings v. Bourdages, 291 Minn. 211, 214, 189 N.W.2d 
706, 709 (1971) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 485 cmt. b (1939))); Lange 
v. Potter, 270 Minn. 173, 178, 132 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1965) (refusing to adopt an 
interpretation of vicarious liability that would narrow or defeat public policy); Bates v. 
Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding no conversion and 
giving weight to public policy goals). 
 3. See infra Parts II-VI. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part IV.A-B. 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. See infra Part VI. 
 10. Lee A. Iacocca, Driving Force—Henry Ford, TIME, Dec. 7, 1998, at 78.  “[I]f it 
hadn’t been for Henry Ford’s drive to create a mass market for cars, America wouldn’t 
have a middle class today.”  Id. at 79.  E. B. White tells us that in the early 1900s, the 
Ford Model T “practically was the American scene,” and that “[f]lourishing industries 
2
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each year.11  Throughout the last century, legislatures and courts have 
looked to common law theories and enacted statutes to protect and 
provide for the injured.12 
A.  Respondeat Superior 
Under the English common law theory of respondeat superior, also 
termed vicarious liability, a master was liable when his servants 
committed torts.13  The practical application of respondeat superior led to 
the theory of the “deep pocket,” under which courts held employers 
liable to injured parties solely on the basis of financial security.14 
Today, courts hold employers liable for their employees’ negligent 
acts.15  The primary contention is that injury is an inherent risk of 
conducting business.16  Consequently, public policy favors placing 
 
fell and rose with it.”  E. B. WHITE, FAREWELL TO MODEL T; FROM SEA TO SHINING SEA 9 
(2003).  He added that “[a]s a vehicle, [the Model T] was hard-working, commonplace, 
heroic; and it often seemed to transmit those qualities to the persons who rode in it.”  Id. 
at 9-10. 
 11. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 681, 684, 686 tbls. 1087, 1092, 1095 (121st ed. 2001)  
(listing 216,309,000 motor vehicle registrations and 11,400,000 motor vehicle accidents, 
causing 41,717 deaths and 3,236,000 injuries in 1999). 
 12. See infra Part II.A-C. 
 13. Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1997) (defining vicarious 
liability as the “imposition of liability on one person for the actionable conduct of 
another, based solely on a relationship between the two persons”) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990)); Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 404, 211 
N.W.2d 783, 785-86 (1973) (stating the master is liable for the servant’s acts where the 
master and servant’s acts may be treated as one indivisible tort); Meyers v. Tri-State 
Auto. Co., 121 Minn. 68, 71, 140 N.W. 184, 184 (1913); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984). 
 14. See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154 (1916) (“In hard fact, the real reason for 
employers’ liability is . . . the damages are taken from a deep pocket.”).  Courts in a 
number of jurisdictions have quoted this phrase.  See Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 
139 (Alaska 1972); Theophelis v. Lansing Gen. Hosp., 424 N.W.2d 478, 482-83 (Mich. 
1988); Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 141 A.2d 276, 296 (N.J. 1958). 
 15. See, e.g., Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 
910 (Minn. 1999) (“[A]cts committed within the scope of employment should be 
allocated to the employer as a cost of engaging in that business.”). 
 16. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 
306, 314 (Minn. 1982) (Peterson, J., dissenting).  Two other justifications for vicarious 
liability are that the employer has the control over the employees, and that an employer 
who takes benefit from her employees’ acts should share the risk of those acts.  Id. at 
313-14.  Weckerly v. Abear, 256 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1977) (“[R]espondeat superior 
commonly is justified as a socially desirable distribution of risk and as a device to 
provide financially responsible indemnitors . . . .”); Laurie v. Mueller, 248 Minn. 1, 4, 78 
N.W.2d 434, 437 (1956) (“[I]f an employer expects to derive certain advantages from the 
3
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liability on employers, who can distribute costs to society through 
pricing and liability insurance.17  In finding vicarious liability, courts 
require that an employee’s act was “foreseeable” and within the “scope 
of employment.”18 
B.  Emergence and Importance of Liability Insurance 
Liability insurance indemnifies the insured against claims, costly 
litigation, and financial ruin.19  Because liability insurance policies are 
 
acts performed by others for him, he, as well as the careless employee, should bear the 
financial responsibility for injuries occurring to innocent third persons . . . .”); Elliason v. 
W. Coal & Coke Co., 162 Minn. 213, 215, 202 N.W. 485, 486 (1925) (“[R]espondeat 
superior rests in part at least upon the power of the master to select, control, and dismiss 
his servants.”). 
 17. See Weckerly, 256 N.W.2d at 81; Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 910. 
 18. Schneider v. Buckman, 433 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Minn. 1988) (stating that it is a 
“well established principle that an employer is vicariously liable for the torts of an 
employee committed within the course and scope of employment.”).  See Fahrendorff, 
597 N.W.2d at 912 (stating foreseeability is a test for liability).  In the context of 
respondeat superior, foreseeability means that “an employee’s conduct is not so unusual 
or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other 
costs of the employer’s business.”  Id. at 912 (quoting Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 
124 Cal. Rptr. 143, 148-49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)).  The scope-of-employment requirement 
exists because the basis for vicarious liability is not finding fault in the employer, but 
whether the employee was conducting the employer’s business.  Lange, 297 Minn. at 
404, 211 N.W.2d at 786 (stating liability is based on whether an employee’s actions are 
related to the employee’s duties and within the work-related limits of time and place); 
Ismil v. L.H. Sowles Co., 295 Minn. 120, 123, 203 N.W.2d 354, 357 (1972); Porter v. 
Grennan Bakeries, Inc., 219 Minn. 14, 21, 16 N.W.2d 906, 909-10 (1944).  The phrase 
“scope of employment” has defied definition and created much litigation.  See Laurie, 
248 Minn. at 4, 78 N.W.2d at 437 (“‘[S]cope of employment’ is impossible of concrete 
definition . . . .”).  See generally Lange, 297 Minn. at 399, 211 N.W.2d at 783 (discussing 
the intricacies of scope of permission).  Some courts have required that an employee was 
acting to further an employer’s business. Lange, 297 Minn. at 401, 211 N.W.2d at 784. 
Yet “it would be a rare situation where a wrongful act would actually further an 
employer’s business.”  Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311.  The most feasible definition to date 
requires an act “related to the duties of the employee . . . within work-related limits of 
time and place.”  See Lange, 297 Minn. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 786. 
 19. Dolly v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d 823, 837 n.20 (N.D. Ohio 
2002) (stating that insurance companies bet against catastrophic-type claims, while the 
insured pays premiums to protect against financial ruin that could result from a large 
claim); Bohna v. Hughes, Thorsness, Gantz, Powell & Brundin, 828 P.2d 745, 754 
(Alaska 1992) (stating the purpose of liability insurance was to protect from financial 
ruin and to compensate for loss); Breland v. Schilling, 550 So. 2d 609, 610 (La. 1989) 
(“The purpose of liability insurance . . . is to afford the insured protection from damage 
claims.”).  Modern liability insurance began in England in the late 1800s.  KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 585.  The purpose of insurance at that time was to indemnify employers 
against employers’ liability and workers compensation claims.  Id.  The successful 
implementation of liability insurance led to demands in other high-risk areas.  Id. 
4
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contracts, courts should interpret policies to reflect the contracting 
parties’ intent.20  However, insurance policies also serve important 
public interests, such as protecting accident victims and limiting 
litigation.21  As a result, some states place statutory requirements and 
restrictions on liability insurance policies.22 
Mass production of motor vehicles began in the early 1900s.23  
What began as an innovative idea eventually led to a staggering number 
of injuries and deaths.24  Financially irresponsible drivers left many 
accident victims without compensation and medical treatment.25  Early 
legislative efforts to protect the injured began with financial 
responsibility laws.26  These laws failed to consistently compensate 
 
 20. Smith v. Matthews, 611 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (La. 1993) (“An insurance policy is 
an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary contract 
principles.”); Hoeschen v. S. C. Ins. Co., 378 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn. 1985) (“[L]iability 
insurance contracts should, if possible, be construed so as not to be a delusion to those 
who have bought them.”) (citing Taulelle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 247, 251, 207 
N.W.2d 736, 739 (1973)); Bobich v. Oja, 258 Minn. 287, 294, 104 N.W.2d 19, 24 (1960) 
(“Contracts of insurance . . . must be construed according to the terms the parties have 
used, to be taken and understood . . . so as to give effect to the intention of the parties as 
it appears from the entire contract.”). 
 21. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 subd. 1, 2 (2002).  See Collins v. Randall 836 So. 2d 352, 
354 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (stating “liability insurance . . . is to protect the public, and not 
just the insured . . . .”); Dickinson v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 6 N.E.2d 439, 441 (Mass. 
1937) (stating that an insurance policy “should be construed liberally to accomplish the 
humane purpose of the Legislature to protect travellers on the highway from injury by 
motor vehicles.”). 
 22. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (requiring insurance policies to contain various types 
and amounts of coverage). Cf. Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 137 N.E.2d 
855, 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (stating such statutory provisions “form a part of such 
contract and should be construed in connection with the policy”) (citation omitted). 
 23. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 244 (1973).  Ford began production of 
the Model T in 1908.  Iacocca, supra note 10, at 76.  In 1912 there were 7000 Ford 
dealers in the United States, and by 1914 “the world’s first automatic conveyor belt could 
churn out a car every 93 minutes.”  Id. at 78.  By 1927 Ford had sold 15 million cars.  Id. 
at 77. 
 24. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 11. 
 25. See 1 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 
1.1, at 3 (2d ed. 1992) (stating there have always been financially irresponsible drivers 
who left victims without compensation). 
 26. The first financial responsibility law was enacted in Connecticut in 1925.  1925 
Conn. Pub. Acts 183.  By 1969 every state except Massachusetts had “inferred a general 
legislative policy to protect the public from uncompensated injury by motor vehicles on 
the state’s highways from the passage of such statutes as financial responsibility 
laws . . . .”  Mt. Beacon Ins. Co. v. Williams, 296 F. Supp. 1094, 1098 (D. Md. 1969).  
These laws required a motorist who failed to satisfy a judgment against him to provide 
assurance that he could satisfy future judgments.  KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 601.  
If the motorist did not provide such assurance, he would lose his license or vehicle 
registration.  Id. 
5
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accident victims.27  However, motor vehicle liability insurance arose as a 
convenient method for proving financial responsibility.28  Legislatures 
later enacted compulsory liability insurance statutes.29  This ensured 
compensation for accident victims, but only where the victims could 
prove fault.30  Thus, victims were without recourse if they could not 
demonstrate fault, and in a precarious position during lengthy 
litigation.31  Sixteen states went further by enacting “no-fault” statutes,32 
which required all motor vehicle owners to carry no-fault insurance.33  
Under such statutes an accident victim’s own insurance company 
provides compensation for medical expenses and lost wages, regardless 
of who caused the accident.34  The intent behind no-fault statutes is to 
avoid inadequate or excessive compensation of victims, to require motor 
vehicle registrants to procure liability insurance, and to provide benefits 
to vehicle occupants and other persons injured in accidents.35 
 
 27. Three factors led to the demise of the early laws: (1) the laws came into effect 
only after an accident, (2) the injured did not sue when liability would be difficult to 
prove, and (3) some motorists preferred to lose driving privileges rather than provide 
security. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 601-02; WIDISS, supra note 25, at 4-7. 
 28. See Joseph P. Murphy & Ross D. Netherton, Public Responsibility and the 
Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEO. L. J. 700, 705 (1959) (“Insurance was the most obvious and 
practical method of maintaining financial responsibility.”). 
 29. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 602-03.  Forty-two states and the District 
of Columbia require automobile liability insurance.  Johnny Parker, The Automobile 
Liability Coverage Step-Down Clause: The Real Deal or Merely the Calm Before the 
Storm?, 10 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 33, 36 n.15 (2001) (quoting ROBERT H. JERRY, II, 
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 949 (2d ed. 1999)). 
 30. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 603. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 607.  The sixteen states are Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Utah.  Id. at n.46. 
 33. See Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 91, 96 
(Minn. 2000) (stating the No-Fault Act mandates no-fault coverage).  No-fault statutes 
and insurance maintain a fault-based system for non-economic loss recovery, under 
which parties must still sue the tortfeasor and prove fault.  See MINN. STAT. § 65B.43 
(2002) (“‘Loss’ means economic detriment . . . consisting only of medical expense, 
income loss, [and] replacement services loss . . . .”). 
 34. See Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 574 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1998) (“The purpose of [uninsured motorist] insurance is to take the place of 
liability insurance that the tortfeasor should have purchased.”).  See generally MINN. 
STAT. § 65B.41-.71 (2002) (detailing the No-Fault Act). 
 35. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002). 
6
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C.  Omnibus Clauses and Permission 
Most liability insurance policies include omnibus clauses.36  In 
some jurisdictions these clauses are a statutory requirement.37  Omnibus 
clauses extend policy protection to unnamed parties who receive 
permission to drive the insured vehicle.38  For example, an omnibus 
clause might read: “you are an insured for any covered auto and anyone 
else is an insured while using with your permission a covered auto you 
own, hire, or borrow.”39 
The term “permission” in the context of omnibus clauses is widely 
debated.40  Although courts treat “permission” and “consent” as 
synonyms when interpreting omnibus clauses,41 the tasks of defining 
permission and determining its scope remain.42  Courts may find 
 
 36. See Christensen v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 2003) 
(stating that policies contain omnibus clauses to hold owners liable for acts of 
permittees); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automobile Insurance § 225 (2003) (“[A]utomobile insurance 
policies generally contain a standard omnibus clause that provides coverage to any person 
using the named insured’s car, if its use is within the scope of the named insured’s 
consent.”). 
 37. See Arnold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 158 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D. Ind. 
1958); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 735 N.E.2d 1045, 1050 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2000); Trow v. Worley, 40 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); 7 AM. JUR. 
2D Automobile Insurance § 22 (2003) (stating that some states have compulsory liability 
insurance and omnibus provisions). 
 38. Kolby v. Northwest Produce Co., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993). 
 39. 16 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 271 (1992). 
 40. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 
165 n.7 (Minn. 1983) (“[T]he word ‘permission’ has bred a most costly and wasteful type 
of litigation.”). 
 41. Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 274 Minn. 297, 303, 143 N.W.2d 635, 640 
(1966).  See also C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: 
Permission or Consent to Employee’s Use of Car Within Meaning of Omnibus Coverage 
Clause, 5 A.L.R.2d 600, 608 (1949) (listing other jurisdictions’ acceptance of “consent” 
and “permission” as synonymous). 
 42. See Christensen v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 586 (Minn. 2003) 
(finding permission when an employee violates express limitation by driving under the 
influence and using employer’s van for his own purposes); Allied Mut. Cas. Co., 274 
Minn. at 305, 143 N.W.2d at 641 (finding coverage when a mother limited vehicle use to 
driving to a movie theater, but daughter and daughter’s friend did not go to a movie and 
instead drove to another town); Anderson v. Hedges Motor Co., 282 Minn. 217, 222, 164 
N.W.2d 364, 368 (1969) (finding no permission where mechanic was to repair the 
owner’s vehicle, had prior permission to use the vehicle for personal errands, but used the 
vehicle a second time for personal reasons); Abbey v. N. States Power Co., 199 Minn. 41, 
46, 271 N.W. 122, 124 (1937) (finding no permission where an electric company 
employee was to raise wires above a house that was being moved, and the employee used 
the vehicle to procure equipment for the house mover). 
7
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permission to use a vehicle through express words, or may imply 
permission from the general circumstances.43  Most jurisdictions have 
adopted one of three rules interpreting the scope of permission in 
omnibus clauses.44 
The “strict” or “conversion” rule is the least accepted 
interpretation.45  Under this rule, the slightest deviation from permission 
in time, place, or use defeats liability under the omnibus clause.46  Of the 
three, this rule most accurately represents the intent of the contracting 
parties and is the most favorable to vehicle owners.47  However, the 
“strict” rule runs contrary to public interest in providing recovery to 
injured persons.48 
The initial permission rule, also termed the “liberal” or “hell or high 
water” rule, extends omnibus coverage even for ludicrous deviations 
from permission.49  Jurisdictions that adopt the initial permission rule 
tend to focus on public policy and accident victims rather than on owners 
and insurers.50  The initial permission rule serves three purposes: (1) to 
further public policy and protect accident victims from financial ruin, (2) 
to discourage lenders and lendees from conspiring to escape liability, and 
(3) to reduce litigation.51  On the other hand, the initial permission rule 
 
 43. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 584. 
 44. Id. (citing Drechsler, supra note 41, at 622). 
 45. See Drechsler, supra note 41, at 625. 
 46. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ragatz, 571 N.W.2d 155, 159 (S.D. 1997). 
 47. See 18 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 at 433 (1992) (stating that “the actual 
use . . . must be the exact use that was contemplated when permission or consent was 
granted,” and that the “strict” rule favors the insurer). 
 48. See 8 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 113:7 (3d 
ed. 1997) (“[C]ourts should be encouraged to adopt a less strict rule in light of the 
legislative history and public policy which favors finding coverage where reasonably 
possible.”). 
 49. Christensen v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 587 (Minn. 2003) 
(stating that ludicrous uses are within permission “as long as they do not constitute theft 
or conversion”) (quoting Raitz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1183, 
1187 n.15 (Colo. 1998)). 
 50. See 18 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 5 at 433 (1992) (stating some jurisdictions 
adopt the rule to further public policy to provide insurance protection to as many people 
as possible). 
 51. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 166 
(Minn. 1983).  See also Vanliner Ins. Co. v. Sampat, 320 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(stating the initial permission rule “is based on the theory that . . . it is not in the public 
interest to permit litigation on the details of a permission and use”); Manzella v. Doe, 664 
So. 2d 398, 402 (La. 1995) (“[O]ne justification for this rule is that it prevents collusion 
between the lender and the lendee to avoid liability.”); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Raincloud, 563 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. 1997) (stating the purpose is to “protect the 
public at large on public roads and highways”); Barry v. Tanner, 547 N.W.2d 730, 733 
8
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“lends itself to gross abuse by an unscrupulous individual who, in 
violation of his express instructions, might retain possession of the 
automobile indefinitely and operate it over unlimited territory with the 
insurance still in effect.”52  Jurisdictions differ over whether omnibus 
clause coverage should extend to second permittees who have permission 
from original permittees.53 
The minor deviation rule or “moderate” rule voids coverage after 
material or gross deviation from the insured’s permission, but sustains 
coverage for slight deviations.54  The minor deviation rule is a 
compromise between the “strict” rule and the initial permission rule.55  It 
“furthers the public policy of compensating victims, recognizes that 
permittees are engaged in various activities and may stray from the exact 
letter of their permission, and . . . attempts to be fair to the insurer. . . .”56  
Arguments against the minor deviation rule are that it encourages 
litigation over what constitutes a “minor deviation,” and that it does not 
ensure coverage for injured parties.57 
D.  Vicarious Liability in Minnesota 
Historically, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held vehicle owners 
vicariously liable for the acts of their permittees.58  The Safety 
Responsibility Act (“SRA”), initial permission rule, and the Minnesota 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act (“No-Fault Act”) are further 
evidence of Minnesota’s focus on accident victims.59 
 
(Neb. 1996) (“Proponents of this rule justify it on the ground that it is good public policy 
to protect persons injured in automobile accidents against uninsured motorists.”). 
 52. Gulla v. Reynolds, 85 N.E.2d 116, 120 (Ohio 1949). 
 53. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ragatz, 571 N.W.2d 155, 158 (S.D. 1997). 
 54. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 165. 
 55. Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 274 Minn. 297, 305, 143 N.W.2d 635, 640 
(1966). 
 56. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 571 N.W.2d at 160. 
 57. Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. 1995) (citing 
Matits v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1960)). 
 58. See Turner v. Gackle, 168 Minn. 514, 515, 209 N.W. 626, 627 (1926) (holding 
defendant liable for his father’s conduct where car was owned for family and business, 
but no express permission was granted to the father); Jaffa v. Libman, 153 Minn. 557, 
557, 190 N.W. 894, 894 (1922) (holding defendant liable for minor son driving with 
permission); Johnson v. Evans, 141 Minn. 356, 360, 170 N.W. 220, 221-22 (1919) 
(implying permission and holding defendant liable for son who had permission to drive to 
one town, but traveled to another); Ploetz v. Holt, 124 Minn. 169, 174, 144 N.W. 745, 
747 (1913) (stating that a father may be liable where a son used a family vehicle for 
personal purposes). 
 59. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 166-67. 
9
Iijima: Tort Law—The Motorist’s Guide to State Policy: Vehicle Owner Vica
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
15 IIJIMA - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:52 PM 
764 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
 
1.  The Safety Responsibility Act 
The legislature passed the SRA in 1933,60 and codified it as 
Minnesota Statute section 170.54 in 1945.61  The SRA expanded the 
operative field of respondeat superior to make vehicle owners vicariously 
liable when their permittees injured third parties.62  The SRA states that 
“[w]henever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state, by any 
person other than the owner, with the consent of the owner, express or 
implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the 
agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof.”63  
The purpose of the SRA was “to make the owner of motor vehicles liable 
to those injured by their operation . . . where no such liability would 
otherwise exist.”64  The legislature believed that the SRA would 
encourage vehicle owners to procure liability insurance and ensure 
recovery for accident victims.65  Minnesota courts liberally construe the 
SRA to serve these purposes.66 
a.  The Minor Deviation Rule 
In the early and mid-1900s, Minnesota courts used the minor 
deviation rule to define the scope of permission under the SRA.67  The 
minor deviation rule relieved vehicle owners from liability where 
servants, employees, and others acted grossly outside the owner’s initial 
grant of permission.68  The determining factor in motor vehicle liability 
 
 60. 1933 Minn. Laws 351. 
 61. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1945). 
 62. See Clemens v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 971, 973 (D. Minn. 1950). 
 63. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1945). 
 64. Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 274 Minn. 297, 301, 143 N.W.2d 635, 638 
(1966) (citing Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406, 
415 (1943)). 
 65. Shuck v. Means, 302 Minn. 93, 96, 226 N.W.2d 285, 287 (1974); Boatwright v. 
Budak, 625 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn. 1983)). 
 66. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 165; Lange v. Potter, 270 Minn. 173, 
178, 132 N.W.2d 734, 737 (1965). 
 67. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 162 (stating the early cases in 
essence applied the minor deviation rule). 
 68. See Lausche v. Denison-Harding Chevrolet Co., 185 Minn. 635, 638, 243 N.W. 
52, 53-54 (1932) (finding no permission when employee had permission to drive 
employer’s car home, but employee used vehicle to attend a carnival after drinking); 
Langan v. Nathanson, 161 Minn. 433, 437, 201 N.W. 927, 928 (1925) (finding an 
employee who took another employee to a physician was outside the scope of 
permission); Mogle v. A. W. Scott Co., 144 Minn. 173, 177, 174 N.W. 832, 834 (1919) 
(finding no permission when an employee used a company-owned vehicle for work, then 
10
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eventually became whether the permittee was outside the express 
restrictions or uses contemplated by the parties at the “time and place” of 
an accident.69 
b.  The Initial Permission Rule 
In 1969, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the minor deviation 
rule in Anderson v. Hedges Motor Co., but noted that only a liberal 
interpretation of the SRA could achieve the public policy goal of 
compensating injured parties.70  That early realization foreshadowed the 
1982 decision in Jones v. Fleischhacker.71  The Jones court adopted the 
initial permission rule for the limited purpose of holding adults liable for 
a minor’s negligent vehicle use.72  The following year, in Milbank 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., the 
court expanded the Jones decision to include adult-to-adult 
transactions.73  In doing so, the Milbank court overruled previous minor 
deviation rule-based decisions.74  Under the initial permission rule, 
“when the owner of a motor vehicle grants another person permission to 
use the vehicle, major departures from the initial scope of permission, 
short of conversion or theft, do not relieve the owner from vicarious 
liability for the permittee’s negligent use of the vehicle.”75  Although 
vicarious liability under both the minor deviation rule and the initial 
permission rule is contingent upon permission, the initial permission rule 
 
drove family members to the park); Wilde v. Pearson, 140 Minn. 394, 397, 168 N.W. 
582, 583-84 (1918) (finding no permission when a minor permitted a third party to drive 
a family vehicle, and the third party drove the vehicle in absence of said minor). 
 69. See Anderson v. Hedges Motor Co., 282 Minn. 217, 220, 164 N.W.2d 364, 367 
(1969); Eicher v. Universal Underwriters, 250 Minn. 7, 14, 83 N.W.2d 895, 899 (1957); 
Truman v. United Prods. Corp., 217 Minn. 155, 159-60, 14 N.W.2d 120, 122 (1944); 
Ranthum v. Ferguson, 202 Minn. 209, 212, 277 N.W. 547, 548 (1938); Patterson-
Stocking v. Dunn Bros. Storage Warehouses, 201 Minn. 308, 312, 276 N.W. 737, 739 
(1937). 
 70. Anderson, 282 Minn. at 218, 164 N.W.2d at 366. 
 71. 325 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. 1982) (stating public policy requires holding 
parents liable for the acts of a child even though the minor disobeyed the parents’ 
instructions). 
 72. See id. 
 73. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 167 
(Minn. 1983) (holding an employer liable for acts of an employee regardless of any 
limitations put on vehicle use). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Bates v. Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing 
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 167). 
11
Iijima: Tort Law—The Motorist’s Guide to State Policy: Vehicle Owner Vica
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
15 IIJIMA - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:52 PM 
766 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
 
makes the scope of such permission irrelevant.76  Minnesota’s 
interpretation of the SRA using the initial permission rule is consistent 
with trends in other jurisdictions and the “weight of authority.”77 
2.  The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act 
The legislature passed the No-Fault Act in 1974,78 and codified it as 
Minnesota Statutes sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 in 1978.79  The purpose of 
the No-Fault Act was to stay the “[t]he detrimental impact of automobile 
accidents on uncompensated injured persons [and] upon the orderly and 
efficient administration of justice . . . .”80  To effectuate this purpose, the 
No-Fault Act requires motor vehicle owners to provide a plan of 
reparation security, such as liability insurance.81 The Act also specifies 
minimum coverage amounts and benefits.82  The net effect of the No-
Fault Act is a guarantee of prompt payment regardless of who caused an 
accident.83  However, Minnesota’s system does not truly disregard 
fault.84  An accident victim must meet certain tort thresholds and then 
sue the at-fault party for any non-economic losses or losses that exceed 
policy limits.85  Although the legislature has enforced state policy 
through various laws, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in adopting the 
initial permission rule, created an exception for instances of 
conversion.86 
 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Wiglesworth v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288, 291-92  (Colo. 1996) 
(citing cases adopting the initial permission rule in Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, and West Virginia); Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 137 N.E.2d 
855, 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) (stating that Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Tennessee, Wisconsin, and probably North Dakota, Oregon, Oklahoma, Florida, 
Indiana, and West Virginia follow the initial permission rule). 
 78. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 408. 
 79. MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1978). 
 80. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002). 
 81. MINN. STAT. § 65B.48 subd. 1 (2002). 
 82. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49 (2002). 
 83. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002). 
 84. See Luna v. Zeeb, 633 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (stating a 
plaintiff must prove “$4,000 of medical expenses or an injury producing a disability of 
sixty days or more, a permanent injury or disfigurement, or death” and then sue to 
recover non-economic losses). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2003) 
(explaining the initial permission rule). 
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E.  Conversion 
1.  Generally 
The tort of conversion grew from the early common law action of 
trover,87 under which a plaintiff alleged that she lost a chattel that the 
defendant found and converted to his own use.88  Eventually, losing and 
finding became a fiction, and courts extended trover to cover any 
interference with an owner’s possessory rights.89  In the United States, 
the modern tort of conversion may have emerged in Johnson v. 
Weedman.90  Following precedent such as Johnson, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 222 states that where a dispossession seriously 
interferes with another’s possessory right, the actor may be subject to 
liability for conversion.91  The terms “seriously interferes” and “may be” 
add complexity to the application of conversion.92  According to the 
Restatement comments, conversion “has been limited to those exercises 
of dominion or control over the chattel which so seriously interfere with 
another’s right to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay 
the full value of the chattel.”93  To qualify as a serious interference, a 
person must have acted with the intent “to deal with the chattel [so] as to 
deprive the other of its possession.”94  This does not require the intent to 
commit a conversion, but requires knowledge that the act is “destructive 
of any outstanding possessory right . . . .”95  For example, if a person 
destroyed a borrowed car by negligently striking a tree, there would be 
no conversion unless the destruction was intentional.96  Accordingly, 
while negligence might result in the destruction of an owner’s chattel, 
 
 87. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 69 (4th ed. 2001). 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 cmt. a (1965) (stating the basis 
was a “fiction of losing and finding”). 
 89. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 15, at 89. 
 90. 5 Ill. 495, 496-97 (Ill. 1843) (finding no conversion for a claim of trover where 
“the plaintiff bailed a horse to the defendant to be agisted and fed . . . and without the 
plaintiff’s authority, [the defendant] rode the horse fifteen miles [and] the horse died 
within a few hours afterwards, but not in consequence of the riding.”).  Counsel for the 
defendant was Abraham Lincoln.  Id. at 496. 
 91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 (1965). 
 92. See generally id. at cmts. a-f. (1965) (discussing the application of the rule and 
giving explanatory examples). 
 93. Id. at cmt. a. 
 94. Id. at cmt. b. 
 95. Id. at cmt. c. 
 96. See id. at cmt. b, illus. 1. 
13
Iijima: Tort Law—The Motorist’s Guide to State Policy: Vehicle Owner Vica
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
15 IIJIMA - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:52 PM 
768 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
 
negligence is not conversion absent the intent to interfere with the 
owner’s possessory right.97 
2.  In Minnesota 
Minnesota courts have consistently defined conversion as “an act of 
wilful interference with a chattel, done without lawful justification, by 
which any person entitled thereto is deprived of use and possession.”98  
In 1978, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 222 in Herrmann v. Fossum.99  Thus, 
Minnesota limited conversion to situations where an actor intended to 
seriously interfere with an owner’s right to possess and control a 
chattel.100  The Christensen decision changed “conversion” in the 
context of motor vehicle liability.101 
III. THE CHRISTENSEN CASE 
A.  Facts 
Appellant Harvey Christensen worked for Independent School 
District Number 787 (“ISD”) as a drivers’ education instructor.102  ISD 
owned and provided a van for Christensen to use for that instruction.103  
Christensen had permission to park the van at his home, but not to use 
the van for personal reasons.104  On July 1, 1994, Christensen completed 
instruction at noon and drove home to wash ISD’s van.105  Throughout 
that afternoon Christensen drank a number of beers.106  At about 6:30 
p.m. Christensen took a cooler of beer and went for a drive in the van.107  
 
 97. Id. at cmt. b. 
 98. Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d 649, 
650 (1948).  See Dain Bosworth Inc. v. Goetze, 374 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985). 
 99. 270 N.W.2d 18, 20-21 (Minn. 1978) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 222 (1965)). 
 100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222; Larson, 226 Minn. at 317, 32 
N.W.2d at 650. 
 101. See infra Part V.B. 
 102. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 2003). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 582-83. 
 105. Id. at 582. 
 106. Id. at 583. 
 107. Id. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/15
15 IIJIMA - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:52 PM 
2003] INITIAL PERMISSION AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY 769 
 
After drinking more beer between 6:30 p.m. and 8:15 p.m.,108 
Christensen destroyed the van when he collided with Veronica Wagner 
on State Highway 10 at 8:30 p.m.109  Wagner and her passengers sued 
Christensen and ISD for damages resulting from the accident.110  
Christensen pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol.111 
ISD held insurance through the Minnesota School Board 
Association Insurance Trust (“MSBAIT”).112  Christensen had personal 
insurance for his own car through Milbank Mutual Insurance Company 
(“Milbank”).113  The MSBAIT policy provided coverage for vehicles 
ISD owned, but for unowned vehicles it limited coverage to debts 
remaining after all other collectible insurance policies had paid.114  The 
Milbank policy provided similar coverage.115  MSBAIT initially 
defended ISD and Christensen, but later tendered defense to Milbank.116  
Milbank refused the tender, arguing that because ISD owned the van 
MSBAIT should be the first to pay claims.117 
Christensen settled the suit for $78,000 pursuant to a loan receipt 
from MSBAIT.118  MSBAIT conditioned the loan receipt upon 
Christensen’s promise to seek declaratory relief against Milbank for 
costs and attorney’s fees arising from the original and declaratory 
actions.119  Christensen sought declaratory relief and summary judgment 
against Milbank for breach of duty to defend and indemnify him.120 
B.  Hennepin County District Court 
The District Court of Hennepin County entered judgment for 
Christensen.121  Three facts were prominent in the court’s analysis: (1) it 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 643 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 111. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 583 n.1. 
 112. Id. at 583. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. The record does not state why MSBAIT tendered the defense to Milbank.  
However, the language in the policies indicates ISD’s insurance would be the default 
policy.  MSBAIT probably presumed that Christensen was outside the scope of ISD’s 
permission, and not covered as a permissive user of the van. See id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 583-84. 
 120. Id. at 584. 
 121. Id. 
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was undisputed that Christensen had permission to use ISD’s van, (2) the 
omnibus clause in the MSBAIT policy stated that permissive drivers 
were plan participants, and (3) the initial permission rule contained a 
“conversion or theft” exception.122  Thus, unless Christensen converted 
the van, ISD would be vicariously liable and the MSBAIT policy would 
cover Christensen.123  After considering general definitions of 
conversion, the court held that Christensen converted the van when he 
took the vehicle, failed to return it, and destroyed it.124 
C.  Minnesota Court of Appeals 
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision.125  In 
making this decision, the court looked to the SRA, the initial permission 
rule, and precedent.126  The court highlighted Minnesota’s policy to 
“ensure members of the public injured by the negligent operation of a 
motor vehicle ‘an approximate certainty of an effective recovery’ when 
liability would not otherwise exist.”127  The court of appeals argued that 
the district court’s definition of conversion was overly broad and did not 
effectuate state policy.128  The court then stated that the supreme court 
had not defined “conversion” within the context of the initial permission 
rule,129 but that conversion was an intentional tort.130  Based on this 
reasoning, the court held that “in a situation in which the property is 
destroyed, conversion may be shown only if the destruction was 
intentional.”131  As all parties agreed that Christensen did not intend to 
destroy ISD’s van,132 the court found no conversion.133  Also, because 
the scope of permission was irrelevant under the initial permission rule, 
the court did not find conversion in Christensen’s use of the van for 
personal reasons.134  Christensen appealed,135 and the Minnesota 
 
 122. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 643 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 644-45. 
 126. See id. at 642-44. 
 127. Id. at 642 (quoting Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 
332 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn. 1983)). 
 128. See id. at 642-43. 
 129. Id. at 643. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 644. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 2003). 
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Supreme Court granted review to consider what constitutes “conversion” 
under the “conversion or theft” exception to the initial permission rule.136 
D.  Minnesota Supreme Court 
In a five-to-two split decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
affirmed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court 
for entry of summary judgment for Milbank.137 
The supreme court explained that the SRA and omnibus clauses 
exist to extend liability insurance to permissive drivers.138  The court 
then stated that its own role was to determine the meaning of “scope of 
permission.”139  The opinion began with three arguments supporting the 
initial permission rule.140  The first argument was that the initial 
permission rule supports the policy behind the SRA.141  Next, the court 
pointed to a trend of interpreting the SRA and omnibus clauses to 
“[favor] protection of the uncompensated victims of automobile 
accidents over any interest of an owner-insured or his insurer that he be 
not subject to liability when his permittee exceeds the scope of the initial 
permission.”142  Finally, the court stated its reliance on legislative history 
(such as the No-Fault Act).143 
After justifying the initial permission rule, the court considered 
whether Christensen’s actions constituted conversion.144  Although 
Christensen argued that intent was immaterial to finding conversion,145 
the court agreed with Milbank that intent was a key element.146  In 
defining conversion, the court looked to case law definitions and 
Restatement comments.147  The court concluded that “[a] wrongful intent 
to appropriate chattel for one’s own purposes is the essence of the 
‘conversion or theft’ exception.”148  The supreme court refused to adopt 
the court of appeals’ intentional destruction requirement because it 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 588-89. 
 138. Id. at 584. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. at 585. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (quoting Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 
N.W.2d 160, 166-67 (Minn. 1983)). 
 143. See id. at 585. 
 144. Id. at 585-86. 
 145. Id. at 585. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 585-86. 
 148. Id. at 586. 
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would unnecessarily narrow the meaning of conversion.149  However, the 
court agreed that accidental destruction of the van could not supply the 
requisite intent for conversion.150  The court further found that 
Christensen’s use of the van for personal reasons, without permission 
and under the influence of alcohol, did not show intent to deprive ISD of 
its right to use or control the van.151  Finding no intent for conversion, 
the court heeded the SRA and applied the initial permission rule to hold 
ISD vicariously liable for Christensen’s conduct.152 
Chief Justice Blatz, joined in dissent by Justice Page, argued that 
Christensen’s decision to drink and drive provided the requisite intent for 
conversion.153  The dissent favored a strict reading of conversion 
definitions.154  Citing a definition from Larson v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co.,155 the dissent implied that because ISD did not give 
Christensen authority to drink and drive and Christensen knew the limits 
imposed by ISD, drinking and driving constituted willful interference.156  
Furthermore, because Christensen broke the law by driving under the 
influence, he was without lawful justification.157  Finally, accidental or 
not, Christensen destroyed the vehicle and deprived ISD of its use and 
possession of the van.158  The dissent admonished the majority for 
interpreting the Restatement’s phrasing, “intention to deal with the 
chattel so that such dispossession results,”159 to mean “intent to 
appropriate chattel for one’s own purposes . . . .”160  The dissent argued 
that such interpretation redefined conversion to mean theft,161 and 
reduced the “conversion or theft” exception to a theft exception.162 
In rebutting the dissent, the majority explained that if drinking and 
driving constituted conversion, the initial permission rule would preclude 
coverage for uninsured permittees.163  The majority stated that such a 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 587. 
 153. Id. at 588. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. See Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. 226 Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d 
649, 650 (1948). 
 156. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 586. 
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decision would contravene state policy to provide recovery to injured 
people.164  The court expressed concern that the dissent’s opinion might 
exempt many negligent behaviors such as drag-racing or speeding.165  In 
addition, the court noted that driving under the influence is not 
negligence per se, so the dissenting opinion would negate insurance 
coverage for non-negligent behaviors.166  The court supported these 
arguments with persuasive authority from the Colorado Supreme Court, 
which held that “even ‘ludicrous’ uses are within the insured’s 
permission as long as they do not constitute theft or conversion.”167 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The Christensen court correctly interpreted legislative intent and 
state policy by refusing to relieve vehicle owners of liability where a 
permittee exceeds initial permission.  However, the decision lacks 
important information, such as whether state policy is well founded, the 
purpose of the “conversion or theft” exception, and the limits of the new 
“conversion” definition.  The answers to these questions hold the key to 
the Christensen decision. 
A.  Foundations of State Policy 
Christensen succumbs to the hefty weight of Minnesota’s historical 
focus on accident victims.168  The policy behind the SRA was to make 
motor vehicle owners liable to those injured by permissive drivers when 
no liability would otherwise exist, and to provide certainty of recovery 
for injured parties.169  In addition, Minnesota “favors protection of the 
uncompensated victims of automobile accidents over any interest of an 
owner-insured or his insurer that he be not subject to liability when his 
permittee exceeds the scope of the initial permission.”170  The supreme 
 
 164. See id. at 587. 
 165. Id. at 586. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 587 (quoting Raitz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1187 
n.15 (Colo. 1998)). 
 168. See id. at 585-87 (relying on MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (2002); Milbank Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1983); Larson v. 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 32 N.W.2d 649 (1948); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 (1965)). 
 169. See, e.g., Hutchings v. Bourdages, 291 Minn. 211, 214, 189 N.W.2d 706, 708-
09 (1971). 
 170. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 166-67.  See also Schwalich v. Guenther, 
282 Minn. 504, 507, 166 N.W.2d 74, 78 (1969) (stating the SRA effected legislative 
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court adopted the initial permission rule because public policies required 
liberal interpretation of the SRA.171  The initial permission rule satisfied 
this requirement by holding owners liable regardless of deviation from 
initial permission.172  As a result, the interests of Minnesota employers 
and vehicle owners took a back seat to state policy.173 
1.  Defense Against the “Deep Pocket” 
Minnesota’s policy and laws enforce the “deep pocket” theory of 
recovery.174  While offering a practical means of recovery for injured 
persons, the “deep pocket” theory retains a twinge of unfairness from the 
time of masters and servants.175  However, the loss-distribution attribute 
of liability insurance substantially changes the “deep pocket” theory.176  
 
policy that the owner should bear the cost of injuries to third parties). 
 171. See, e.g., Jones v. Fleischhacker, 325 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Minn. 1982) (stating 
the SRA must be given liberal interpretation to “achieve the purpose of giving to persons 
injured by the negligent operation of automobiles an approximate certainty of an effective 
recovery . . .”).  See Bates v. Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) 
(stating that Minnesota courts use the initial permission rule to interpret the SRA, and 
that a liberal interpretation of the SRA protects injured parties). 
 172. See Bates, 603 N.W.2d at 681 (defining the initial permission rule). 
 173. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 165-66 (stating state policy focuses 
on victims instead of drivers, that the SRA effectuates state policy, and that the initial 
permission rule “alone guarantees fulfillment of the state’s policy of compensating 
innocent accident victims from financial disaster.”). 
 174. See Balderrama v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 324 N.W.2d 355, 358 (Minn. 1982) 
(considering whether the No-Fault Act is a “deep pocket for those avoiding their own 
responsibilities in operating motor vehicles,” and rejecting the idea); Ossenfort v. 
Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 672, 687 (Minn. 1977) (holding an 
employer liable when an employee caused a motor vehicle accident and expressing 
concern that the holding could be seen as being based on the employer’s “deep pocket”); 
Frank W. Hackett, Is Master Liable for Tort of Servant?, 7 HARV. L. REV. 107, 112 
(1893) (questioning vicarious liability and concluding the master is “able to respond with 
his money,” and that “[w]e see no hardship in making him pay the bills”). 
 175. See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 
(1973) (stating that we seek to compensate injured people, but are hesitant to impose 
liability on an employer who did not directly cause the injury); Elliason v. W. Coal & 
Coke Co., 162 Minn. 213, 219, 202 N.W. 485, 488 (1925) (“Charging [the master] with 
the fault of the servant is a purely arbitrary act of the law.”) (quoting Hackett, supra note 
174, at 111); P.S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (1967) 
(“[G]enerations of lawyers have felt in some uneasy way that there is something so odd 
or exceptional about vicarious liability that it needs justification . . . .”); KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 499 (stating vicarious liability imputes negligence to an “additional, 
albeit innocent, defendant”). 
 176. See Buglioli v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 811 F. Supp. 105, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(stating courts will apply loss-distribution rules in motor vehicle accident cases); ATIYAH, 
supra note 175, at 14-15 (stating that fault is irrelevant and insurance spreads accident 
costs to taxpayers and to the motoring community). 
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In procuring liability insurance, each insured pays a relatively small fee 
to gain indemnity from accident claims and litigation; so what began as 
the deep pocket of a single employer has become a societal blanket 
covering all motorists.177 
Mandatory insurance laws, omnibus clauses, and Minnesota’s SRA 
followed the success and practicality of liability insurance.178  Today the 
law seems less concerned with blaming vehicle owners than with 
providing a means of compensation and medical attention to the 
injured.179  Of course the system is imperfect; an owner’s premium may 
rise, some people may become uninsurable, and many vehicle owners 
refuse to maintain insurance despite the laws.180  From a broad 
perspective, the assurance that society will care for injured accident 
victims who face financial ruin makes such issues a small price to pay 
and justifies favoring the injured.181 
2.  Justifying the Initial Permission Rule 
The minor deviation rule used scope of permission to limit liability 
under the SRA and omnibus clauses.182  In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court adopted the initial permission rule, noting a “trend toward the 
expansion of omnibus clauses” and an increase in social concern to 
 
 177. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 2 (1986). 
 178. See supra Part II. 
 179. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 2003) 
(stating public policy is to protect injured victims); Milbrandt v. Am. Legion Post of 
Mora, 372 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Minn. 1985) (stating that under the No-Fault Act an insurer 
“has a duty to pay basic economic loss benefits to its insured without regard to fault”); 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, at 615 (stating compensation may now be paid on the basis 
of strict accountability rather than fault). 
 180. See Rehnelt v. Stuebe, 397 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1986) (pertaining to a 
plaintiff who refused to carry no-fault insurance); Balderrama v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 
324 N.W.2d 355, 358 (Minn. 1982) (“[P]ersons must contribute premiums to the 
insurance pool; otherwise, responsible persons carrying insurance become the insurers of 
those unwilling to pay . . . .”); Nelson v. Hartz Truckline, 401 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1987) (regarding an over-the-road truck driver being discharged because his 
driving record rendered him uninsurable). 
 181. See Glockel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 400 N.W.2d 250, 258 (Neb. 
1987) (stating compulsory insurance laws “evidence a policy of protecting the innocent 
victims of automobile accidents from financial ruin”); David A. Fischer & Robert H. 
Jerry, II, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best Solution, 45 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 857, 862 (2001) (stating that “the benefits provided by liability insurance are also 
enormous,” and “liability insurance gives individuals and firms some measure of security 
against the risk of financial ruin . . . .”). 
 182. See supra Part II. 
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provide compensation to injured parties.183  The court also noted that 
insurance companies were willing to provide broader coverage in lieu of 
high litigation costs.184 
Under the No-Fault Act, a motorist must carry liability insurance, 
including provisions for uninsured motorists.185  Thus, when an 
uninsured motorist causes an accident, the victim’s own insurance 
company provides compensation.186  Because insurance is mandatory 
and the victim’s policy provides coverage, the purpose of discarding the 
minor deviation rule in favor of the initial permission rule comes into 
question.  One rationale is that the tremendous number of motor vehicle 
accidents presents limitless factual situations.187  Courts following the 
minor deviation rule must determine case-by-case whether a motorist 
was within the scope of permission.188  Because litigation is expensive 
and time-consuming, expeditious claim settlement serves the interests of 
the state and the litigating parties.189  Another problem arises when 
courts relinquish liability based on deviations from the scope of 
permission.190  Medical treatment, rehabilitation programs, and an 
inability to work may lead to financial ruin for permittees and their 
victims.191  Even where the permittee injures a driver who has no-fault 
insurance, serious injury could exceed policy coverage.192  The injured 
party could then directly sue the uninsured permittee, which may only 
add unpaid legal fees to unpaid hospital bills.193  By holding vehicle 
 
 183. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 165 
n.7 (Minn. 1983). 
 184. Id. 
 185. MINN. STAT. § 65B.41-.71 (2002). 
 186. MINN. STAT. § 65B.43 (2002). 
 187. See supra note 11. 
 188. See Am. Fid. Co. v. N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 204 A.2d 110, 114 (Vt. 
1964) (Shangraw, J., concurring) (stating the minor deviation rule “breeds litigation”). 
 189. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (2002); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 
408 S.E.2d 358, 364 (W. Va. 1991) (stating the initial permission rule “best effectuates 
the legislative policy of providing certain and maximum coverage, and is consistent with 
the language of the standard omnibus clause automobile liability insurance policies” 
(quoting Matis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 345, 349 (1960)). 
 190. See Verriest v. INA Underwriters Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. 1995). 
 191. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 17 (Fla. 1974) (stating no-fault 
laws stave off financial ruin by providing prompt reimbursement for essential out-of-
pocket losses); Verriest, 662 A.2d at 972; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 
486 N.W.2d 235, 241 (N.D. 1992) (stating the purpose of financial responsibility laws is 
to protect victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial ruin). 
 192. See MINN. STAT. 65B.49 subd. 3a (2002) (requiring only $25,000 of uninsured 
motorist coverage for injury or death). 
 193. See Rehnelt v. Stuebe, 397 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1986); Kleeman v. 
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owners liable for the acts of permittees regardless of scope of permission, 
the initial permission rule supports state policy and makes use of the 
insurance infrastructure.194  Thus, the number, complexity, and 
seriousness of motor vehicle accidents, the benefits of limiting litigation, 
and social policies demanding coverage for the injured justify the initial 
permission rule in Minnesota.195 
B.  Examination of the Law 
1.  Conversion in the Context of the Initial Permission Rule 
The Christensen court applied the initial permission rule and 
refused to find conversion even where a permissive driver’s intentional 
and negligent act resulted in the destruction of a vehicle and injuries to 
third parties.196  The SRA was the basis for the decision, and states that 
anyone using a vehicle with the owner’s permission is the owner’s 
agent.197  The supreme court interpreted the SRA using the initial 
permission rule to make scope of permission irrelevant.198  The single 
exception to the rule is where the court finds “theft or conversion.”199 
Although the court adopted the initial permission rule to guarantee 
recovery to injured parties and reduce litigation,200 the exception is 
justified because permission, not scope of permission, is the bright line 
courts use to limit liability.201  This rationale for requiring permission 
stems from the negligence and foreseeability test of respondeat 
superior.202  While the general purpose of the initial permission rule is to 
 
Cadwell, 414 N.W.2d 433, 440 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Randall, J., concurring specially) 
(“In a complex personal injury or products liability case . . . out of pocket costs for 
discovery and experts through a trial can run into thousands of dollars.”). 
 194. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 332 N.W.2d 160, 
166 (Minn. 1983) (adopting the initial permission rule to effectuate state policy by 
holding owners and their insurers liable to injured accident victims). 
 195. See generally MINN. STAT. 65B.41-.71; Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 
N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 2003); Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 160. 
 196. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 586-87. 
 197. MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (2002). 
 198. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 162; Bates v. Armstrong, 603 N.W.2d 
679, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
 199. See Bates, 603 N.W.2d at 682 (“[T]he conduct required to terminate permission 
must be tantamount to theft or conversion.”). 
 200. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.W.2d at 166. 
 201. See Bates, 603 N.W.2d at 681 (“Liability depends not on the scope of 
permission, but on whether permission was given in the first instance.”). 
 202. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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make scope of permission irrelevant when interpreting the SRA and 
omnibus clauses, the “conversion or theft” exception negates liability 
where a vehicle owner has given no permission and therefore has not 
been negligent.203 
In Christensen, the majority, the dissent, and the parties argued over 
the purpose of conversion within the context of the initial permission 
rule.204  The central dispute was whether and what type of intent the 
court should require for finding conversion.205  Christensen mistakenly 
argued that intent was irrelevant.206  Conversion is an intentional tort and 
by definition requires intent.207  In addition, “[m]ere proof of the 
happening of an accident is not enough to establish negligence or its 
causal relation to the damage.”208  The dissent argues that by requiring 
“intent to appropriate chattel for one’s own purposes” the majority 
redefines conversion to mean theft.209  The dissent would follow the 
Restatement and case law definitions of conversion that require only the 
intent to deprive an owner of use and possession through dominion, or 
control.210  Such definitions would allow courts to find conversion after a 
vehicle owner granted permission.211  According to the majority, finding 
conversion after an uninsured and intoxicated driver received initial 
permission would conflict with state policy.212  The majority states that if 
driving under the influence constituted conversion, courts might 
withhold relief even where the driver was not negligent.213  The majority 
cites Minnesota law and precedent under which driving while intoxicated 
 
 203. See supra notes 201, 202 and accompanying text.  See also Verriest v. INA 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 967, 972 (N.J. 1995) (stating that two questions will 
determine coverage: (1) whether an owner gave initial permission, and (2) whether 
subsequent use constituted theft or the like). 
 204. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585-88 (Minn. 2003). 
 205. See id. at 585-88. 
 206. Id. at 585. 
 207. See Herrmann v. Fossum, 270 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Minn. 1978) (stating conversion 
is an intentional tort). 
 208. State v. Paskewitz, 233 Minn. 452, 461, 47 N.W.2d 199, 204 (1951). 
 209. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588 (Blatz, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
 210. See id.; Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d 
649, 650 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 cmt. a (1965). 
 211. See sources cited supra note 210. 
 212. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 586 (stating that following the dissent’s opinion 
would preclude recovery for accident victims). 
 213. See id. (arguing that because traffic violations are not negligent per se, finding 
conversion for intoxicated driving would preclude coverage without negligence (citing 
MINN. STAT. § 169.96 (2002))). 
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is evidence of negligence, not negligence per se.214  Such arguments 
complicate the matter, however, and other jurisdictions provide insight 
into the Christensen decision.215 
The majority opinion is consistent with jurisdictions where the 
exception is not “conversion or theft,” but “theft or the like.”216  
Legislative intent in these jurisdictions is to except only situations 
involving no express or implied permission.217  In fact, Nebraska derived 
their “theft or conversion” exception directly from the “theft or the like” 
exception in Illinois and New Jersey.218 
 
 214. See id. at 586-87 (citing MINN. STAT. § 169.96(b)); Raitz v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1183, 1187, n.15 (Colo. 1998); Wiglesworth v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 917 P.2d 288, 292 (Colo. 1996); Kedrowski v. Czech, 244 Minn. 111, 118, 69 
N.W.2d 337, 342 (1955); Kirsebom v. Connelly, 486 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992); Mueller v. Sigmond, 486 N.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 215. See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
 216. In Mattis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 345, 349 (N.J. 1961), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that “if a person is given permission to use a motor vehicle in 
the first instance, any subsequent use short of theft or the like while it remains in his 
possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties, is a permissive use . . . .”  
The court reaffirmed this holding in Odolecki v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 264 
A.2d 38, 42 (N.J. 1970).  Mattis and Odolecki form the basis for many jurisdictions that 
recognize, if not adopt, the “theft or the like” exception.  See Mt. Beacon Ins. Co. v. 
Williams, 296 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (D. Md. 1969) (refusing to adopt the initial 
permission rule but recognizing the exception stated in Mattis, 166 A.2d 345); Raitz v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 1179, 1185 (Colo. 1998) (citing Odolecki, 264 
A.2d at 42); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 297 N.E.2d 163, 167 (Ill. 
1973) (citing Odolecki, 264 A.2d at 42); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Lanoha 
Landscape Nursery, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Neb. 1996) (citing Odolecki, 264 A.2d at 
42); Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Collins, 730 A.2d 833, 837 (N.J. 1999) (citing Tooker v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 319 A.2d 743 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (citing 
Odolecki, 264 A.2d at 42)); Am. Fid. Co. v. N. British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 204 A.2d 
110, 114 (Vt. 1964) (Shangraw, J., concurring) (citing Drechsler, supra note 41, at 629-
36; Mattis, 166 A.2d at 345); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 408 S.E.2d 358, 
364 (W. Va. 1991) (citing Mattis, 166 A.2d at 349).  Other jurisdictions recognize the 
“theft or the like” exception, though by other means.  See Hartford Accident & Indem. 
Co. v. Abdullah, 156 Cal. Rptr. 254, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc. 
v. Vicente, 891 P.2d 1041, 1052 (Haw. 1995) (citing Columbia Cas. Co. v. Hoohuli, 437 
P.2d 99, 103 (Haw. 1968)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 788 P.2d 340, 345 (N.M. 1990). 
 217. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Kendle, 318 N.E.2d 644, 648 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974) 
(stating “theft and the like” includes only situations where there is no permission from the 
insured owner). 
 218. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 P.2d at 345 n.4 (stating that some courts list “conversion” 
as an exception but that the court’s “research indicates . . . only one court has addressed 
the meaning of conversion in this context and has rejected the application of the 
definition of tortious conversion to the exception recognized”); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 553 N.W.2d at 740 (restating the initial permission rule exception as “theft or 
conversion” after adopting the rule from jurisdictions that recognize a “theft or the like” 
exception). 
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The dissent is correct that under general definitions of conversion 
Christensen converted the van through a willful and illegal act that 
deprived ISD of its possessory rights.219  However, because the purpose 
of the conversion exception is to limit liability where a vehicle owner did 
not grant permission, legislative intent and state policy do not support the 
dissent opinion in the context of motor vehicle liability.220  ISD gave 
Christensen permission to use the van.221 The exceptions to the initial 
permission rule apply only in absence of permission.222  Thus, the 
majority was correct in finding no conversion. 
2.  Effects of the Christensen Decision 
Prior to Christensen, motor vehicle owners were not liable for 
injuries that occurred materially outside the scope of permission where 
common law conversion disarmed the SRA and omnibus clauses.223  
Now, owners who give permission to drive their vehicles are liable for 
subsequent injuries, with virtually no exception.224  Theft would preclude 
liability; however, it is unlikely a court would find theft following a grant 
of permission.225  The Christensen decision is not limited to alcohol-
related incidents, and applies to vehicle liability cases generally.226  
Although the court’s analysis revolved around defining “conversion,”227 
the net effect was merely a clarification of legislative intent behind the 
initial permission rule.228  Thus, common law conversion should never 
have been an exception to the initial permission rule, and remains 
 
 219. See supra Part II.D (discussing the dissent’s argument in favor of conversion). 
 220. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
 221. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 2003). 
 222. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 643 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002) (“There are no supreme court cases defining the term ‘conversion’ when used in 
this context.”).  Previous cases considering conversion in the context of the SRA and 
initial permission rule used the common law definition of conversion.  See Herrmann v. 
Fossum, 270 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. 1978); Larson v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 226 
Minn. 315, 317, 32 N.W.2d 649, 650 (1948). 
 224. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588. There have been no reported cases 
absolving a vehicle owner from liability in Minnesota since Christensen. It remains to be 
seen if any factual situations beyond theft will become exceptions to the rule. 
 225. See id.  See also 7 AM. JUR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 111 (2002) (stating that 
when an insured gives consent to use his or her vehicle, such consent may preclude 
coverage for theft). 
 226. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 586-87 (expressing concern over drag-racing, 
speeding, and other “ludicrous” vehicle uses). 
 227. See id. at 585-86. 
 228. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text. 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 15
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss2/15
15 IIJIMA - PAGINATED.DOC 1/13/2004  3:52 PM 
2003] INITIAL PERMISSION AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY 781 
 
unaffected by Christensen.229 
V. WARMING UP TO VEHICLE OWNERS: A PROPOSED PLAN 
The Christensen decision may have a negative impact on employers 
and others who will hesitate to grant permission for business and other 
beneficial purposes.230  While more lenient methods, such as the minor 
deviation rule, increase litigation and ultimately inhibit state policy,231 
current laws may create unfair situations.232  With Minnesota’s policy in 
mind, the supreme court correctly chose the initial permission rule, and 
correctly defined the role of conversion within that rule.233  Moving 
forward, the legislature must give consideration to business practices and 
the interests of vehicle owners.  One option is to take a stance between 
the minor deviation rule and the initial permission rule.234  However, 
Minnesota policy backs the initial permission rule,235 and a better choice 
may be to create an exception that fulfills state policy while allowing 
 
 229. See id.  The words of Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) characterize this issue 
well: “The difference between the almost right word and the right word is really a large 
matter—’tis the difference between the lightening-bug and the lightning.”  Letter from 
Mark Twain to George Bainton (undated), in THE ART OF AUTHORSHIP, LITERARY 
REMINISCENCES, METHODS OF WORK, AND ADVICE TO YOUNG BEGINNERS, PERSONALLY 
CONTRIBUTED BY LEADING AUTHORS OF THE DAY, at 87-88 (George Bainton ed., 1890). 
 230. Cf. Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588 (Blatz, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (stating vehicle owners will be liable in every circumstance except 
theft). 
 231. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 175. 
 233. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 585-86 (discussing the reasons for adopting the 
initial permission rule and definition of conversion).  Thomas Jefferson once wrote: 
With your talents and industry, with science, and that stedfast honesty 
which eternally pursue right, regardless of consequences, you may 
promise yourself everything—but health, without which there is no 
happiness.  An attention to health then should take place of every other 
subject. The time necessary to secure this by active exercises, should 
be devoted to it in preference to every other pursuit. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr. (July 6, 1787) in 11 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 558 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). 
 234. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc. v. Vicente, 891 P.2d 1041, 1048 (Haw. 1995) (stating 
the court will “construe the scope of permission more broadly than under the minor 
deviation rule, [but will] not go so far as to construe it so broadly as to adopt the initial 
permission rule”). 
 235. “[W]here the legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme of motor vehicle 
legislation designed to assure that persons who cause automobile accidents are able to 
answer financially to their innocent victims, the liberal or ‘initial permission’ rule . . . 
should be adopted . . . .” 8 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE, 
§113:9 (3d ed. 2003). 
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vehicle owners a choice in liability.  For example, the SRA could read: 
Whenever any motor vehicle shall be operated within this state, 
by any person other than the owner, with the consent of the 
owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of 
accident be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor 
vehicle in operation thereof.  Major departures from the initial 
scope of permission, short of theft or the like, do not relieve the 
owner from vicarious liability for the permittee’s negligent use 
of the vehicle, except where a permittee insured in accordance 
with state law expressly accepts liability on behalf of the 
owner. 
Under such a provision, employers could require employees to 
accept liability and show proof of insurance before using company 
vehicles.  The employer’s insurance would cover business-related 
vehicle use, while the employee’s insurance would cover personal use.  
Friends and neighbors could loan and borrow vehicles after agreeing 
which party’s insurance would be responsible for accident injuries.  Such 
amendments could tame any negative impact that state policy has on 
society, yet assure recovery for injured persons. 
This solution would require employers to define the scope of 
employment, which has proven difficult in the past.236  On the other 
hand, even broad definitions of personal use such as driving after 
drinking alcohol or driving a specified distance off-course could provide 
a flexible guideline for courts.  This solution may also increase litigation.  
Individual vehicle owners and their permittees may disagree over who 
was liable for accidents.  Placing the burden of proof on the permittee to 
show the owner accepted liability may limit such litigation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Christensen decision is the most recent link in Minnesota’s 
long chain of vehicle owner liability cases.  The Christensen court 
essentially eliminated the initial permission rule’s conversion 
exception.237  This is a necessary extension of existing legal 
interpretation, and owners who give initial permission should expect to 
 
 236. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140 (Alaska 1972) (“‘[S]cope of employment’ 
[has] produced confusing and contradictory legal results . . . .”); id. at 141 (“[N]o 
categorical statement can delimit the meaning of ‘scope of employment’ once and for all 
times.”); Laurie v. Mueller, 78 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Minn. 1956) (“‘[S]cope of 
employment’ is impossible of concrete definition . . . .”). 
 237. See Christensen, 658 N.W.2d at 588. 
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be vicariously liable for subsequent injuries in virtually every 
instance.238 
The Christensen decision supports the goal of Minnesota policy and 
tort law by ensuring compensation to injured accident victims.239  
However, legislative and judicial efforts have failed to create a 
satisfactory balance between state policy and a general moral sense that 
vehicle owners should not be penalized for another person’s wrongful 
actions.240  Furthermore, laws and rules purporting to serve the best 
interests of society should not encourage people to distrust others for fear 
of liability.  The notion that vehicle owners can foresee and control a 
permittee’s future acts is mere fiction used to justify risk-distribution.241  
Over the years, the legislature and courts have made great progress 
toward protecting accident victims through policies, laws, and rules.  
Now the laws must be refined until the system provides for the injured, 
minimizes litigation, and allows businesses and individuals to use and 
limit use of their motor vehicles as they see fit. 
 
 
 238. See id. 
 239. See supra note 2. 
 240. See supra note 175. 
 241. See sources cited supra note 16. 
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